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from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond 
1. Introduction 
The UN Climate Summit in Paris was a major success for EU climate 
diplomacy, far away from Copenhagen’s blow to the EU’s self-image as a 
global climate leader; stood-off by China in 2009, or the disappointing 
round of negotiations in Warsaw in 2013, when the EU wanted to offer 
more, but could not due to its internal divisions and crises. Divided by the 
economic and financial Euro crisis, and the recent major migration influx, 
the tendency to prioritize national over regional issues has further eroded 
the EU’s credibility as a leader in climate negotiations.  
The UN Climate Summit in Paris has been a resurrection of European 
credibility in international climate negotiations as the Union’s negotiation 
strategy in the run-up to the summit and the alliance with developing 
countries, as well as with major emitters played a key role in making the 
agreement possible. The following discussion paper looks at recent 
developments in the European Union’s internal and external environmental 
policy, from disaster at the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 to 
the success in Paris in 2015, highlighting how dividing interests have been 
overcome, so internal and external consensus and alliances could be built. 
It provides insights into the making of the Paris Agreement, the EU’s role 
in building it and the issues that need to be discussed for its effective 
application. As the agreement itself is a piece of paper, everything will 
depend on its implementation efforts. Thus, the paper concludes with 
suggestions for the EU’s environmental policy towards implementing the 
agreement with a particular view until 2018 (when the first UNFCCC 
facilitative dialogue will present a first opportunity to assess collective 
efforts in achieving the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement) and the 
transition road to a sustainable carbon neutral economy in the long-run.  
2. EU Environmental Policy from Copenhagen to Paris 
The 20-20-20 Climate and Energy Package 
The EU Environmental Policy has come a long way since the UN Climate 
Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 where the EU negotiated with rather 
unambitious environmental targets based upon the 20-20-20 Climate and 
Energy Package adopted in 2008.1 The package included three major goals: 
Firstly, to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% until 2020 
(compared to 1990 levels). Secondly, to raise the share of renewables in the 
energy mix to 20%. Thirdly, to improve energy efficiency by 20%. 
The first goal of the 20-20-20- Package is reducing CO2 emissions by 20% 
until 2020 (compared to 1990). The 20% reduction target was translated 
into a 21% reduction target between 2005 and 2020 for the EU’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) on the one hand, and a 10% reduction target for the 
sectors not covered by the ETS, on the other, over the same period. 2 
Analysis by the Climate Action Tracker rated the 20% CO2 emission 
reduction goal as inadequate, as it is only in-line with the very least 
stringent of categories. Partly due to the financial and economic crisis, the 
2020 goal has already been met in 2012.3 
 
1 The EU’s Climate and Energy 20-20-20 Package was adopted by the European 
Council in March 2008, and by the European Parliament on 18 December 2008, 
respectively. The targets were reconfirmed again in 2010 as part of the EU’s 10-
year strategy “EUROPE 2020 – A European strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”. 
2 The reduction undertaken through the ETS is higher because it costs relatively less 
to reduce emissions from sectors covered by the system. 
3 See Climate Action Tracker, available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/ 
countries/EU. 
Furthermore, the goal included a promise to scale up emission reduction 
commitments to 30% “if other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced 
developing countries contribute adequately to a global effort according to 
their responsibilities and respective capabilities“4. This condition further 
cemented the negotiating firewall between developed and developing 
countries around the issue of Common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR) that has stalled climate negotiations for decades. 
CBDR is a principle of international environmental law and was enshrined 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) since the creation of the UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992. It refers to the issue of equity within a goal of universality, balancing 
the need for all states to take responsibility for global environmental 
problems and, on the other hand, the need to recognize the wide differences 
in levels of economic development between states and the historic 
responsibilities for environmental degradation. 
The second goal of the 20-20-20 Climate and Energy Package was 
integrating and raising the share of renewables in the energy mix up to 
20%. The Climate Action Tracker projects that this target will be met by 
2020. In 2009, under the Renewable Energy Directive, EU member 
countries have taken on binding national targets for raising the share of 
renewables in their energy consumption by 2020.5  To reflect countries’ 
different starting points for renewables production and ability to further 
increase it, these targets vary, from 10% in Malta to 49% in Sweden. They 
also include a specific goal of a 10% share of renewables in the transport 
sector. 
 
 
4 See: Questions and answers on the Communication Analysis of options to move 
beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon 
leakage, October 2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/. 
 2020/faq_en.htm (updated 21 March 2016, accessed 25 March 2016). 
5 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. 
The third goal was to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 which is 
roughly equivalent to turning off 400 power stations. As of 2010, energy 
efficiency had only increased by 9.8%. The EU would thus need to double 
its efforts in order to reach the target. Measures for increasing energy 
efficiency are set out in the Energy Efficiency Plan (2011) and include inter 
alia: 
‐ Reduction of energy consumption in the construction sector (which 
accounts for nearly 40% of final energy consumption); 
‐ Preparation of National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) 
every three years; 
‐ Reinforcement of the Eco-design Directive and stricter energy 
efficiency standards;  
‐ Rollout of close to 200 million smart meters for electricity and 45 
million for gas by 2020; 
‐ Support for new, green equipment and infrastructures. 
These measures are financed by instruments such as the Intelligent Energy 
Europe Programme and the European Energy Programme for Recovery.6 
Consequently, the EU passed on further environmental legislation and 
strategies (such as the the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap, the Energy 
Efficiency Plan and a White Paper on Transport) in the following years.  
In October 2010, the European Commission reconfirmed that raising 
ambitions on CO2 emission reduction targets was made dependent upon 
other countries’ commitments. As these conditions had not yet been met, it 
proposed not to move to a 30% target. Long-term planning of GHG 
emissions by 80–95% below 1990 levels by 2050 was also still made 
conditional on necessary reductions to be collectively achieved by 
developed countries in line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).7  
 
6 EU Energy Efficiency Plan 2011. 
7 EU Commission Staff Working Paper: Analysis of options beyond 20% GHG 
emission reductions: Member State results, SWD(2012) 5, Brussels, 1 February 
2012. 
The EU proceeded, however, in translating the region-wide target into 
binding annual greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits for each country 
under the Effort Sharing Decision in 2011. The Effort Sharing Decision 
sets national emission targets for 2020, expressed as percentage changes 
from 2005 levels, for sectors not part of the ETS (such as housing, 
agriculture, waste and transport). Targets are set according to a linear path, 
while allowing for some flexibility between time periods and member 
states, allowing for carbon trading through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). They differ according to 
national wealth – from a 20% cut for the richest countries to a maximum 
20% increase for the least wealthy. The decision also lays down how the 
annual emission allocations (AEAs) in tonnes for each year from 2013 to 
2020 are to be calculated. AEAs were approved by the EU Climate Change 
Committee in October 2012, adopted by the European Commission in 
March 2013 and adjusted in October 2013. For individual member states’ 
GHG emission limits (see Table 1 in the Annex).8 
In 2012, scenario analysis by the the European Commission suggested that 
a more integrated approach to environmental protection is needed as 
increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix requires reliable and 
intelligent infrastructure and smart grid connections. While the EU might 
be well on track to reaching its emission reduction targets, energy 
efficiency is still lagging behind. 
The Juncker Comission  
After the years of apathy described above, the Juncker Commission was a 
fresh start for the environmental policy of the EU. The new commission 
merged the Climate Action and Energy portfolios, as well as the 
Environment, Maritime and Fisheries portfolios. This choice was 
controversially discussed among environmental observers and non-
 
8 Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 
2020. 
governmental organisations who wrote an open letter to the Commission, 
highlighting their concern about the new Commission structure and the 
choice of Commissioners which would “all reveal a serious downgrading 
of environment and a roll back of EU commitments to sustainable 
development, resource efficiency, air quality, biodiversity protection and 
climate action.”9 Magda Stoczkiewicz, Director of Friends of the Earth 
Europe, pointed out that “while climate and energy are inextricably inter-
related, there is a real danger that by merging these two departments 
climate concerns will be side-lined by energy issues.”10 The Commissioner 
chosen to lead the work for Energy and Climate Action was the centre-right 
Spanish politician Miguel Arias Cañete. Critics questioned his commitment 
to climate action given his prior involvement with and shares in the oil 
company Petrolifera Ducar. 
The 2030 EU Framework for Climate and Energy Policies  
With the Juncker Commission, the EU raised its ambition to a 40% GHG 
reduction by 2030 under the newly adopted EU Framework for Climate and 
Energy Policies. Under the merged Climate Action and Energy portfolio, 
environmental targets were also incorporated into the objectives of the 
European Union’s Energy Policy which combines five closely related and 
mutually reinforcing dimensions: 
1) Energy and foreign policy unity by removing technical or regulatory 
barriers in order to create a fully-integrated internal energy market, 
connecting networks and pooling pool resources, leading to lower 
prices and increased competition, as well as a better negotiating 
position towards non-EU countries. 
2) Less dependence on energy imports and supply security by 
diversifying energy sources (increasing the share of renewables and 
lowering imports from the East).  
 
9 See Friends of the Earth Europe (2014): New Commission sidelining environment, 
Friends of the Earth Europe, 11 September 2014, available at 
http://www.foeeurope.org/new-Commission-judged-action-100914. 
10 Ibid.  
3) Energy efficiency: reduce overall energy use by at least 27% by 2030, 
as set in the EU 2030 strategy, also contributing to diminishing import 
dependence. 
4) Lower GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030, as set in the EU 2030 
strategy, by reforming the EU Emissions Trading System, (ETS) 
pushing for the Paris Agreement and its implementation, and 
encouraging private investment in new infrastructure and technologies. 
The European Council decided to pass on 43% of the emission 
reduction effort to the sectors already covered by the carbon market and 
30% to other sectors such as agriculture and transport. A reserve of 2% 
of the carbon quotas was also to be set aside for the member states 
whose GDP is below 60% of the EU average.11 
5) Become a global leader in renewable energies and lead the fight against 
global warming by investing in climate research and innovation, 
supported by Private Public Partnerships (PPPs). 
The EU is well on track to achieve its target to reduce region-wide 
emissions by “at least” 40% by 2030. For individual Member States’ GHG 
emission limits, see Table 1 in the Annex. However, the target itself is 
rated only medium in terms of ambition by the Climate Action Tracker.12 
Some observers argue a reduction target of 55% would be a more equitable 
share in regard to historic responsibilities and capacity.  
The process of agreeing on a target demonstrated the internal division 
within the EU, as particularly Eastern European states wanted to make the 
overall goals less ambitious, non-binding and – yet again – dependent upon 
other actors’ commitments. Several other member states and non-state 
actors (notably the UK, and the Dutch consultancy Ecofys) have argued 
that a higher target of 50% would be required to demonstrate fairness from 
Europe (notably conditional on other ambitious climate actions by 
 
11 Carbon Market Watch (2014): Analysis of Europe’s 2030 Climate Ambition, 31 
October 2014, available at http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
10/2030-Council-Conclusions-Analysis_final.pdf. 
12 See Climate Action Tracker, available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/ 
 EU#Footnotes. 
countries such as China). Reaching an agreement on the 40% target was 
only possible as it was horse-traded against passing a future (Post-2030) 
EU climate and energy framework by unanimous vote. This will make 
further ambitions much harder to achieve. For individual member states’ 
positions on the EU Framework for Climate and Energy Policies see Table 
2 in the Annex. 
The second binding goal set in the 2030 EU Framework for Climate and 
Energy Policies is increasing the share of renewables in total energy 
consumption to at least 27%. The framework supports progress made 
towards the transformation of the energy system e.g. by extending 
production capacities and grid connection; securing an affordable and 
secure energy supply, while at the same time benefitting health and 
environment and creating opportunities for growth and employment. The 
plan will require investments of an estimated EUR 38 billion per year 
within the period from 2011 to 2030 with more than half of it being 
necessary in the construction and service sector. The majority of these 
investments shall be covered by savings in fossil fuel imports, reducing 
import dependency.13 According to the Climate Action Tracker, the EU is 
well on track to achieve its goal in regard to increasing the share of 
renewables in the energy mix.14 
The third goal, energy efficiency, targets a 27% decrease in primary energy 
consumption with a review towards a 30% target being foreseen in 2020. In 
July 2014, the EU was expected to achieve energy savings of 18%-19% by 
2020, missing the 20% target by 1%-2%, even though energy efficiency 
has often been described as the low hanging fruits of the energy 
transition.15 Different to the first two targets, the energy efficiency target is 
not legally binding. 
 
13 See European Commission (2014): A policy framework for climate and energy in 
the period from 2020 to 2030, Communication from the Commission to the 
european parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 22 January 2014.  
14 See Climate Action Tracker. 
15 The Commission had originally proposed to reduce energy use by 30%, but the 
European Council only endorsed a target of 27%.  
The goals set in the 2030 EU Framework for Climate and Energy Policies 
are implemented through a wide variety of instruments and political 
directives laid down in the Roadmap for Industry and the Energy Roadmap 
2050, the Effort Sharing and the Renewable Energy Directives and new 
indicators for competition, supply diversification and the integration of 
member countries’ electricity networks. Furthermore, there is a wide range 
of other EU wide regulations influencing GHG emissions such as binding 
emission targets for new car and van fleets, a new regulation on fluorinated 
gases, and further implementation of the Ecodesign legislation for boilers 
and water heaters (EEA, 2014). Overall, and even though plans for a new, 
more coordinated and coherent governance system (that allows for a more 
long-term planning and thus, investment security) are needed to make 
European Climate Policy more efficient, the set of EU policies is still one 
of the most comprehensive climate packages on a global level. 
Last but not least, the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is an important – 
but, despite several reforms still malfunctioning – instrument of European 
climate policy. In May 2015, the European Council agreed on another 
mayor ETS reform by introducing the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) 
which aims at adjusting the surplus supply of emission allowances on the 
market and, thus, their price. This new instrument shall become operational 
in January 2019, so that 900 million allowances taken away from the 
market in 2013 can be directly transferred to the reserve instead of flooding 
the market and contributing to further decrease in the prices.16 
In 2015, the European Environment Agency (EEA) sees the EU well on 
track to meeting and overachieving its 20% GHG emission reduction target 
as defined in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2013-
2020) as region-wide GHG emissions decreased by 23% between 1990 and 
2014.17 The Union is heading for a 24% reduction in 2020 on track to 
 
16 See European Parliament and Council of Europe (2015): Decision 2015/1814 
concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the 
Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme, 6 October 2015. 
17 In the same period the EU economy grew by 46%. Emission reductions are 
averaged over the respective time period as defined by the Quantified Emission 
Limitation and Reduction Objective (QELRO) in the Second Commitment Period 
of the Kyoto Protocol.  
significantly over-achieving its Kyoto second commitment period target. 
However, current policies are projected to reduce domestic emissions by 
23–35% below 1990 levels and hence do not -yet -put the EU on promising 
a trajectory towards meeting either its 2030 goal of a a 40% reduction (as 
ratified by the Council with the Doha Amendment in July 2015) or 2050 
targets.18  
Building external consensus and ambition  
The European External Action Service (EEAS), established by the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, was one crucial element for bringing more consistency to 
the EU’s relations with third countries and regions. The effect was already 
visible two years later during the Durban Summit, where the EU did not 
only speak with a unified voice but was also central to the “Durban 
alliance” of least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing 
states (SIDS) threatened by rising sea levels, as well as the Cartagena group 
of progressive countries. Together, the bloc is thought to have restricted the 
less climate-friendly stances from China or India. But the EU’s global 
stock has declined a bit since then, as its politicians have appeared torn 
between the desire to help global decarbonisation, while balancing 
oppositions to more climate aid during a time of austerity. During the 
disappointing round of negotiations in Warsaw in 2013, the EU wanted to 
offer more, but could not due to its internal division and crisis. In the 
meantime, other countries (such as Costa Rica and the SIDS) became more 
ambitious in regard to climate mitigation actions and more flexible and 
creative in regard to international diplomacy (e.g. Brazil). At the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Lima in 2014, the EU 
was not able to push its goal of a more transparent and competitive ongoing 
evaluation of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). 
Instead, targets were reviewed only after all pledges have been summited. 
 
18 See European Environment Agency (2015): Trends and projections in Europe 2015 
– Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets, European 
Environment Agency (EEA), Report No 4/2015, Luxembourg, 2015, available at 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2015 and 
Climate Action Tracker, available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/ 
 EU#Footnotes. 
In the same year, a new phase of the EU’s flagship climate initiative, the 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA, later GCCA+) started as part of 
the European Commission’s new Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-
2020). Established by the EU in 2007 to strengthen dialogue and 
cooperation with developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS), the GCCA+ 
supports 51 technical and financial support programmes around the world 
with a budget of more than EUR 300 million. It also serves as a platform 
for dialogue and exchange of experience between the EU and developing 
countries, focusing on climate policy and bringing renewed attention to the 
issue of international climate finance. The results continue to feed into 
negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).19 
3. The role of the EU in the run-up to COP21  
COP21 was a major success for EU climate diplomacy, far away from 
Copenhagen's blow to the EU’s self-image as a global climate leader. 
Building internal consensus and speaking with a unified voice was 
achieved by shaping and revitalizing the EU’s internal climate action by 
passing the 2030 EU Framework for Climate and Energy Policies in 
October 2014. One year before the UN summit in Lima, the European 
Union had already agreed to a unified negotiating position as member 
states had agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by ‘at least’ 40% by 2030 
compared to 1990 levels (and did not make further commitments dependent 
on those of others as it was the case at COP15 in Copenhagen). The 
harmonized negotiation position clearly strengthened the voices of member 
states, who vote individually during negotiations of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The harmonized 
negotiation position clearly strengthened the voice of member states, who 
vote individually during UNFCCC negotiations. Due to the early build-up 
of internal consensus, the EU was not as divided as in Copenhagen and 
could clearly advance regional interests in unity. 
 
19 See GCCA, available at http://www.gcca.eu/about-the-gcca/what-is-the-gcca. 
On 19 January 2015, EU Ministers endorsed a major diplomatic plan to 
push for an ambitious deal on global warming with over 90,000 diplomats 
in over 3,000 missions as well as A-list celebrities lobbying to make 
climate action a strategic priority at G7, G20 and Major Economies Forum 
summits and to win new pledges for ambitious greenhouse gas cuts 
(INDCs), mobilising maximum pressure on key countries in international 
climate negotiations, while managing climate finance expectations at the 
same time.20  
The EU’s more detailed Paris Protocol, published on 25 February 2015, 
states that COP21 should set a long-term 2050 climate goal, as part of a 
legally binding climate agreement applicable to all countries. It proposes a 
60% cut in global emissions by 2050 against a 2010 baseline. This is 
consistent with the latest science, which says global emissions should be 
between 40 and 70% below 2010 levels in 2050, reaching net zero between 
2080 and 2100, if global warming is to be limited to two degrees above 
pre-industrial temperatures.21 
On 6 March 2015, the EU was the first major economy to submit a region-
wide INDC of “at least 40%” emissions reductions until 2030 to the 
UNFCCC, providing another boost to the Paris momentum.22 Compared to 
other INDC submissions, such as Mexico’s (which was the first major 
developing country to submit an INDC) or Gambia (whose ambitious 
targets were a surprise during negotiations), the EU target is rated only 
medium by the Climate Action Tracker23 . Non-governmental observers 
such as the WWF has described it as “thin on details and low on 
ambition”. 24  This is partly due to preferences of Eastern European 
 
20 Neslen, Arthur (2015): EU to launch diplomatic offensive ahead of Paris climate 
talks, euractiv, 20. Jan. 2015 (updated: 23. Jan. 2015, accessed 23 March 2016), 
available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/eu-to-
launch-diplomatic-offensive-ahead-of-paris-climate-talks/. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The EU is the only regional economic community (REC) that is recognized as Party 
to the UNFCCC. 
23 See Climate Action Tracker. 
24 See World Wildlife Fund (2015): The EU’s climate commitment is thin on details 
and ambition, WWF, 6 March 2015, available at http://www.wwf.org.uk/ 
about_wwf/press_centre/index.cfm?7502. 
countries that had advocated for lower targets upfront.25 Nevertheless, the 
proposed INDC target is still twice as high as the target for 2020, and – 
differently to the period before 2020 – will not make use of international 
credits as it refers to domestic emission reductions only. Moreover, the 
INDC of the EU is broadly consistent with the 2050 target, which 
reinforces the EU’s intent to reduce its emissions by 80–95% by 2050 
compared to 1990, and hopefully, increased policy coherence. 26 
Furthermore, the current INDC does not include emissions and removals 
from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) – something 
that had been initially proposed by the EU but which was largely criticized 
as it would reduce the EU’s overall climate ambition by offsetting carbon 
absorbed by forests could against reduced efforts in other parts of the 
economy, de facto backsliding in overall ambition. Inclusion of LULUCF 
has been left open for the next round of submissions. 
Despite the critique, the target set by the EU was convincing enough to 
mobilize the support for other nations, as they were underpinned by 
substantial pledges to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) particularly by 
Germany, France and the UK. This was topped up with the European 
pledge to allocate €475 million to support climate action, resilience 
building and the environment in ACP countries, as agreed upon in the 11th 
European Development Fund Intra-ACP Strategy, running from 2014 to 
2020.27 These pledges reinforced the credibility of the EU ambitions, as 
emission reduction targets were substantially higher than at COP15 in 
Copenhagen (increase from 20 to 30 percent) and financial aid more 
tangible than at COP19 in Warsaw. For further information, see chapter 
“Climate finance and the Green Climate Fund” on page 18. 
 
 
25 See Table 2 in the Annex for individual countries positions to the 2030 
Environmental Package. 
26 See Climate Action Tracker. 
27 See Intra-ACP Cooperation – 11th European Development Fund, Strategy Paper 
2014-2020, establishing the EU's position for the UN climate change conference in 
Paris, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/intra-acp-
strategy-11-edf-2014-2020_en.pdf. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)  
Compared to the Kyoto Protocol INDCs include the following additional 
rules: 
 
• A single 1990 base-year for all parties and gases; 
• No recognition of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the 
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period; 
• Legislation foresees the need to include international maritime emissions 
(which together account for 3% of global emissions).  
• No inclusion of emissions and removals from LULUCF  
 
Source: Climate Action Tracker 
On 18 September 2015, the EU Environment Council adopted conclusions 
for the EU’s position for the UN climate change conference in Paris, 
calling for a “durable, legally binding, agreement, preferably a 
protocol”.28 Ministers agreed that the EU would aim to reach an ambitious 
and dynamic agreement, with the objective of keeping global warming 
below 2°C. To achieve this objective, the Council stressed that global 
greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 at the latest, be reduced by 
at least 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 and be near zero or below by 2100. 
Regarding CBDR, the agreement should include “mitigation commitments 
for all Parties, to be updated every five years”.29 Concerned about the slow 
progress of the negotiations, the Council proposed early ministerial 
engagement before COP 21 as a way forward. Five days later, the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) 
adopted a report, calling for a five-year review and reinforcement cycle, as 
well as a a roadmap for scaling up EU climate finance and earmarking 
revenues from emission allowances and from future taxes on aviation and 
shipping emissions for that purpose.30 
 
28 See European Parliamentary Research Service (2015): EU approach to the Paris 
climate conference, October 12, 2015, available at: http://epthinktank.eu/. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
Building on these “stick and carrot” tactics of financial promises and fairly 
(but not too) ambitious targets, the EU member states – together with a 
group of Small lsland Developing States (SIDS) through the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) – played a leading role in driving forward the 
high ambition coalition in the run-up to and during the Paris negotiations. 
The group was joined by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group 
of States, and soon after by other countries, including deal breakers such as 
Brazil, Canada, Japan and the US. The EU had been preparing this 
coalition since the beginning of the year, with outreach efforts going to the 
Caribbean, the Pacific, Latin American (AILAC) countries, and Morocco. 
This was a very smart move, indeed, reminiscent of the strategic alignment 
of the EU with ACP countries during the UN Climate Summit in Durban in 
2011, and other UN summits, when the EU played a key role as a 
“leadiator” in climate change negotiations: Being a moral leader by 
example, while mediating between others in order to build a bridge 
between developing and developed countries. 31  Danish foreign minister 
Martin Lidegaard saw the EU in a “unique position” for facilitating this 
bridge-building which would be “a precondition for success in Paris” as 
the divide over CBDR has stalled UN climate talks for decades.32  
The high ambition coalition caused a big media show. This put the 
necessary pressure on China and lndia, weakening their role within the G77 
and isolated hardliner countries like Saudi Arabia and South Africa, 
particularly in regard to climate finance and time-bound commitments. 
Doing so, the coalition was successful in blurring the lines between rich 
and poor countries and in rallying broad support on the key elements of an 
ambitious deal. As of the 8th December 2015, three days before the end of 
the Paris round of negotiations, the high ambition coalition represented 
more than 100 countries and the majority of parties at the UN climate talks, 
 
31 See Bäckstrand, Karin; Elgström, Ole (2013): The EU's role in climate change 
negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
Volume 20, Issue 10, 2013, pages 1369-1386. 
32 Neslen, Arthur (2015): EU to launch diplomatic offensive ahead of Paris climate 
talks, the Guardian, Brussels, 20 January 2015, available 
at:http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/20/eu-to-launch-diplomatic-
offensive-ahead-paris-climate-talks. 
including both, developed and developing countries, big and small, rich and 
poor.33 
The key negotiating goals of the high ambition coalition were based upon 
the agreement signed by its initiators, the EU and the ACP group which 
states that the Paris Agreement must be “legally binding, inclusive, fair, 
ambitious, durable and dynamic” and that “it must set out a clear and 
operational long-term goal which is in line with science”. They also agreed 
on the establishment of a “review mechanism for countries to come 
together every five years to consider progress made and to enhance 
collective and individual efforts as appropriate”.34 Overall, the agreement 
broadly summarises the EU’s negotiation position and became a major part 
of the Paris Agreement. 
4. The Paris Agreement – the beginning of a new era 
of climate diplomacy? 
The Paris Agreement was largely received very positively, even by large 
international NGOS such as Greenpeace and WWF. It was coined a 
“revolution” (Francois Hollande), a “turning point” (Barack Obama) and a 
“diplomatic triumph” (Jeffrey Sachs) in longstanding climate negotiations. 
The mere fact alone that after 21 years of negotiations, 195 countries 
signed an international climate change agreement is indeed an 
extraordinary accomplishment. For the first time in history, all nations, 
including the largest emitters, have crafted a universal and (partially) 
legally binding agreement on climate change. The ambition of the 
agreement is to keep global warming well below 2°C and declaring an 
effort to cap it at 1.5°C, while allowing for some flexibility through carbon 
trading between nations. 
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Furthermore, the conference organisation and the excellent leadership of 
the COP21 president, the French environmental minister Laurent Fabus, 
were praised from all sides. Even though security was particularly high 
after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2016, the conference 
organisation and negotiations went largely smoothly – as compared to 
Copenhagen where protests and chaos broke out, with the venue finally 
being shut to outsiders during the last days of negotiations, and where the 
upfront leaking of the Copenhagen Accord sowed distrust among 
negotiators.  
Paris was also a Master class in international negotiation and diplomacy: 
The diplomatic tit-for-tat included major trade-offs between developing 
and developed countries such as trading the long-term target of greenhouse 
gas neutrality in the second half of the century against the inclusion of the 
goal to cap global warming at 1.5°C.35 While the EU inititially supported a 
target of a maximum global average temperature rise of 2°C, it later agreed 
upon the negotiation target of the ACP group of 1.5°C which marks the 
difference between drowning and surviving in many SIDS. The 1.5°C 
target was included in the non-binding part of the Paris Agreement, 
dropped against the inclusion of GHG emission neutrality, a provision that 
OPEC countries had fiercely resisted.36 Another diplomatic manouver was 
to make the document an “agreement” as agreements are binding, yet not 
ratifiable, and thus, do not need to pass through the US Senate. 
The Paris Agreement succeeded in blurring the division between rich and 
poor countries, polluters and sufferers, introducing a new era of climate 
diplomacy where global collective action meets national interests in a 
pledge-and-review mechanism and giving hope for life after 
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multilateralism. The forward-looking interpretation of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR–RC, 
before CBDR) through a dynamic pledge-and-review system, aimed at 
ramping up ambitions via a five year review and scaling-up mechanism 
(which allowed negotiators to circumvent the long-standing “firewall” 
between developed and developing countries), mixing a top-down with a 
bottom-up approach. Thus, the agreement may itself be fair enough in 
terms of climate justice in case climate finance and emission reduction 
commitments are implemented as projected. Until now, climate finance 
pledges have been promising and nations have seriously increased their 
emission eduction targets in the run-up to COP21.  
Climate finance and the Green Climate Fund 
The target of USD 100 billion for the Green Climate Fund by 2020 had 
already been defined in 2010 during COP16 in Cancun in 2010, Mexico, 
when nations agreed to contribute 30 billion dollars each year up until 
2012, rising to 100 billion US dollars as from 2020. Right after COP19 in 
Warsaw in 2013, the Fund’s Independent Secretariat in Songdo, South 
Korea, began its work. An important milestone was the first replenishment 
of the GCF where it received commitments of just over 10 million US 
dollars in 2014. Since then the GCF Board has been working on all 
necessary regulations, modalities and funding criteria at its regular 
meetings. Of the money channeled through the GCF, half will go to 
funding adaptation measures in developing countries (such as better flood 
defences, drought monitoring schemes, and water management systems) 
out of which at least half will go to countries that are most at risk from the 
impacts of climate change. The other half of the GCF’s money will go 
towards helping developing countries curb their emissions, by 
decarbonising their energy and transport infrastructure (mitigation). 
In the run-up to COP21, nations have significantly increased their pledges 
to the GCF, first and foremost the fund’s biggest contributors such as the 
US (USD 3 million), Japan (USD 1.5 million), UK (USD 1.2 million), 
France (USD 1 million) and Germany (USD 1 million).37 GCF funding was 
topped up with the European pledge to allocate €475 million for climate 
action, resilience building and the environment in ACP countries until 
2020.38 In 2014 alone, the EU earmarked EUR 14.5 billion for climate 
action in developing countries (ca. 20% of overall development funding), 
pledging ambitions to do even more in the years to come. 39 The objective 
is for all pledges to be converted into contribution agreements within one 
year from the time at which they are made. 
Another public sector climate funding initiative that was announced during 
COP21 was Mission Innovation – a coalition of 20 governments, 
representing 75 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions from electricity and 
80 percent of the world’s investment in clean energy research and 
development, including some of the largest largest oil and gas producers as 
well as many countries with a high penetration of renewables in their 
power sectors. 40  Each country pledged that it will “seek to double its 
governmental and/or state-directed clean energy research and development 
investment over five years”, and that “[n]ew investments will be focused on 
transformational clean energy technology innovations that can be scaled to 
varying economic and energy market conditions that exist in participating 
countries and in the broader world”. 41  Overall, pledges amount to a 
doubling of funds for clean energy research totalling USD 20 billion over 
five years. For comparison: As of February 2016, the Green Climate Fund 
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stood at USD 10.2 billion – a third of the amount promised by 2012 in 
Cancun.42  
This scale-up in public climate funding was equally matched  by the private 
sector, as pledged by 20 wealthy private investors, including Bill Gates and 
Mark Zuckerberg, as part of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition. The 
coalition is expected to raise several billion dollars to fund start-ups within 
the sector. Acknowledging the fact that climate change poses immense 
potential risks to businesses, investors and markets, the aim of the 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition is to “form a network of private capital 
committed to building a structure that will allow informed decisions to help 
accelerate the change to the advanced energy future our planet needs”. 43  
Its vision for doing so may be summarized by investing early, broadly, 
boldly, wisely and together. It will be implemented by an industry-led 
disclosure task force as part of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
under the chairmanship of Michael Bloomberg, the Task Force on 
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). This Task Force will 
“develop voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for 
use by companies in providing information to lenders, insurers, investors 
and other stakeholders” 44, providing its first report by the end of the year. 
Loss and Damage  
Another major breakthrough for developing countries was the recognition 
of loss and damage, separately from adaptation, as well as the inclusion of 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) 
and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+). 
However, the Paris Agreement could have been much stronger in regard to 
safeguarding equity: Even though it acknowledges loss and damage, there 
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is no legitimate legal claim or liability for compensation. In the particular 
case of forests, their support to human adaptation has not been 
acknowledged and result-based adaptation funding and its effective 
channeling to smallholder farmers is still an unsolved issue. Nevertheless, 
the agreement is a major success for the African Group of Negotiators and 
the ACP Group as it reaffirms the view that climate change is the single 
greatest challenge to the sustainable livelihood, security and well-being of 
ACP citizens, posing significant immediate and long-term risks to their 
sustainable development efforts, and even mentions Africa’s particular 
vulnerability to climate change and “the need to promote universal access 
to sustainable energy in developing countries, in particular in Africa”.45  
Still a long way to go 
Despite all these successes, it is still questionable whether the deal will 
make “our children and grandchildren […] see that we did our duty” as 
David Cameron promised, as the agreement itself is a piece of paper and 
everything depends on its implementation efforts: 187 nations pledged 
their INDCs to the global emission reduction targets together before the 
Paris Conference, together with plans for comprehensive Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). Critics like Bjorn Lomborg, 
Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, and MIT Scientist Joan 
Sterman consider the deal to be a lemon because it will make little change 
to actual global temperature rises. In an open letter some of the world’s top 
climate scientists (including i.a. Prof. Peter Wadhams and Prof. Stephen 
Salter, of the Universities of Cambridge and Edinburgh) called the 
agreement a false hope that could ultimately prove to be counter-productive 
in the battle to curb global warming as actions agreed are far too weak to 
get anywhere close to the targets and voluntary carbon markets may create 
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the wrong incentives for developed countries to outsource emissions and do 
less at home.46  
The Climate Action Tracker projects that even if the targets were fully 
implemented, global warming would still be inbetween 2.7-4.0°C (and not 
6°C) in 2100 as compared to pre-industrial levels. Lomborg’s evaluation of 
the agreement in the Global Policy Journal suggests that even in case all of 
the agreement’s promises on cutting carbon-dioxide emissions are 
implemented within the time period 2016-2030, it may reduce global 
temperature rise by just 0.05°C by the year 2100 and by 0.17°C if promised 
emission cuts continue unabated throughout the century. MIT Scientist 
Joan Sterman comes to similar conclusions. The UN projects that if current 
INDCs are implemented, the treaty will only achieve less than 1% of the 
emission cuts needed to meet target temperatures. Thus, human kind is still 
far away from stopping dangerous global climate change, but the most 
nightmarish scenarios will now probably be avoided. 47 
The deal built a bridge between today's policies and climate-neutrality 
before the end of the century, by setting the long-term goals of 2°C – with 
an effort to reach 1.5°C – and acknowledging the need for global emissions 
to peak as soon as possible (recognising that this will take longer for 
developing countries) and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter. 
However, for reaching the long-term target of 2°C, responding emission 
reduction pathways need to be calculated by setting a goal of net zero 
emissions with carbon emissions dropping to net zero between 2060 and 
2075, and a decline of total GHG emissions to net zero between 2080 and 
2090. If we want to limit global warming to below 1.5°C, we will need to 
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reduce carbon dioxide emissions to net zero between 2045 and 2050 with 
respective GHG emissions will need to decline to net zero between 2060 
and 2080.48  
In this regard, it is unfortunate that setting a goal for reaching zero 
emissions was eliminated from the Paris Agreement in exchange for the 
inclusion of the 1.5°C target. Instead, a more vague formulation of 
balancing greenhouse gas emission and absorption by the second half of the 
century has been incorporated. Also, the assessment and review mechanism 
for monitoring the commitments (which was a major priority of the 
German and the US delegation) is only going to start in 2018 as the exact 
design of the mechanism still needs to be worked out. With national 
commitments only being ramped up in 2020, this leaves another five years 
to accumulate greenhouse gases in the “atmospheric bathtub”, leaving 
99% of the problem for future leaders.  
Last but not least, global climate finance for developing countries is still 
inadequate, even though nations significantly increased their pledges before 
the Paris summit. Critics from small and developing countries and non-
governmental observers have been disappointed that the goal of at least 
$100 billion a year in contributions to the Green Climate Fund, provided 
mainly by rich countries, is mentioned only in the preamble of the Paris 
Agreement, which is not legally binding. The GCF had originally aimed to 
get countries to pledge $15 billion in seed funding by the end of 2015, but 
had to lower its target to USD 10 billion in September 2015. As of 
February 2016, the Green Climate Fund stood at only USD 10.2 billion in 
pledges from 42 state governments. Critics maintain that even if the 
pledged sum was reached it would not be enough to help developing 
countries build up power systems based on renewable energy sources rather 
than coal and oil quickly or cheaply enough. They also fear that climate 
funds are subtracted and re-labeled from other sources (double-counting) 
and that they will be mostly provided in the form of loans. Regarding 
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increased climate finance beyond 2020, no commitment has been made in 
the Paris Agreement.  
5. Implementing the Paris Agreement 
The immediate next steps after Paris are the signature and ratification of the 
Paris Agreement which will be opened during Earth Day on 22 April 2016 
on the invitation of UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon. It will enter into 
force once at least 55 Parties representing at least 55% of global emissions 
have ratified it. The first litmus test will be the upcoming UNFCCC 
meetings in Bonn in May 2016, when technical experts meet to further 
work out and interpret the details for implementation. 
Regarding the ramping up of INDCs, the devil is – yet again – in the detail 
as many developing countries have made their INDC conditional on 
developed countries support. Compliance will depend on the design of the 
review mechanisms to be developed until 2018 when a facilitative dialogue 
will present a first opportunity to assess collective efforts in achieving the 
long-term goal. From then on, nations will have two more years to ramp up 
their targets until the first five-year review in 2020, hoping for international 
pressure to mobilize further collective action. Governments now have to 
live up to and exceed their promises, translating the pledges into binding 
national commitments in order to rapidly decarbonize economies while 
ensuring energy access to billions living without it in developing countries. 
What is needed now is the implementation-friendly specification and 
ramping up of goals and INDCs and their transformation into nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs), which may only be legally enacted by 
2020. Nations must capitalize on the Paris momentum until then, tapping 
the potential of non-state, subnational and local actors, and especially in 
regard to global climate finance, technological transfer and capacity-
building in developing countries. Internationally renowned climate 
economist Lord Nicholas Stern, Chair of the Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of 
Economics (LSE), further recommends investments in “climate coherent” 
infrastructure that promotes – rather than derails – sustainable development 
and growth in the mid- to long-term view. 49 Given the fact that the world’s 
urban population will increase from around 3.5 billion today to around 6.5 
billion by 2050, planning and building these cities will be crucial, 
determining whether they will be clean and efficient, or congested, dirty 
and polluted. According to an analysis by the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate, global investment in infrastructure of about US$ 90 
trillion will be needed over the next 15 years, mostly in developing and 
emerging market countries.50 If we lock in high-carbon infrastructure into 
these long-term investments, this may imply a great danger to fighting 
climate change. In order to encourage investment into new clean 
infrastructure, global and regional financial institutions need to go green as 
they play a crucial role in helping to reduce the risks and cost of capital for 
private investors, taking the risks of early stage development and providing 
long-term loans in ways that the private sector finds difficult to offer. To 
bank on the hope that climate actions will turn out to be cheaper, easier, 
and quicker once nations start to surpass their actual decarbonisation 
pledges, countries will also need to invest much more in low carbon 
research and development, making green technologies cheaper and 
affordable for everyone to switch: “We are spending too much time on 
making fossils more expensive instead of focusing on investing in research 
and development of renewables in order to make them cheaper and 
affordable for everybody.” 51  The funds pledged for research and 
development of climate-friendly technologies by Mission Innovation and 
the Breakthrough Energy Coalition are already a right step in this direction. 
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6. EU Environmental Policy after Paris  
Regarding the EU, climate change advocacy for implementing the Paris 
Agreement and the region-wide INDC are strategic priorities for the 
Union’s diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy 
instruments which are laid down in the Council Action plan for EU’s 
climate diplomacy action in 2016 in the context of low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. According to the Action Plan, the EU will 
need to step up its international climate diplomacy to maintain the political 
momentum after Paris and support other countries in the implementation of 
the agreement and their climate plans. In this respect, the EU remains 
committed to scaling up the mobilisation of international climate finance.52 
The Commission will present during the next 12 months the key remaining 
legislative proposals to implement the 2030 framework. This includes 
proposals for an Effort-Sharing Decision for sectors not covered by the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and on Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF), legislation to set up a reliable and transparent climate 
and energy governance mechanism for the post-2020 period, as well as 
policy proposals to adapt the EU’s regulatory framework in order to put 
energy efficiency first and to foster EU’s role as a world leader in the field 
of renewable energy. 53  “The EU and member states’ development 
cooperation with third countries should fully take into account the existing 
synergies between climate objectives and the sustainable development 
goals as adopted by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” and 
“address the link between climate change, natural resources, prosperity, 
stability and migration” 54, drawing the topic into broader social programs.  
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Critical observers fear that this would make climate action even less 
effective as it would have to serve many masters. Further, it may facilitate 
the relabelling of funds. Last but not least, it may deprive climate action of 
its objective, science-based, and neutral aura, and subject it to the forces of 
political polarization as has already started with the securisation of climate 
politics. The described effects could already be observed during the 
securitization of climate policy that started in 2007 (see discourse below). 
 
Securitisation of climate policy or climatization of security policy?55 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
acknowledged climate change as a risk to human security in its 4th 
Assessment Report. In the same year, UN Security Council had 
climate refugees on its agenda and voices for granting political 
asylum for climate refugees became louder. The Report “Climate 
Change and International Security” of the Council of the European 
Union (2008) represented climate change not as a trigger but as a 
“threat multiplier”, extending the range of issues from the human 
security threat in so-called “hot spots” to a preventive security 
policy that suits the EU’s geopolitical interests, especially in regard 
to energy security and migration. The academic community 
increasingly perceives climate change as a security threat, 
vulnerability and challenging risk. The 5th IPCC Assessment 
Report in 2014 further emphasizes the relationship between global 
climate change, human security and development, especially in the 
areas of energy and food security, as well as migration due to 
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permanent environmental damage caused by floods, droughts and 
land degradation. However, the extended concept of human security 
catapults the topic into “high politics”. Proponents argue that this 
would make European Climate Policy more efficient and coherent, 
while critics fear that the sectoralisation of climate change policy 
may counteract its intents and effectiveness. 
Independent of the empirical foundation how climate change 
exactly affects human security (whether it is rather a trigger for 
other threats or an independent security factor), the discursive 
construction of climate change as part of security and other policy 
areas is already a problem, according to Neo-Gramscian analysis. 
As a study by Broszka und Oels shows, the result of the 
securitization of climate policy is not making the subject a higher 
political priority, neither mobilising action through increased 
visibility, nor leading to stricter environmental regulations in the 
sense of a positive-pluralistic approach. Instead, four policy areas 
have been “climatized”: development policy, defense policy, 
immigration policy and civil protection. This can be seen e.g. by the 
rising share of development assistance from the Pentagon up to 
nearly 22% in the course of the fight against terrorism or the British 
armed forces adopting a climate concept in 2009 which not only 
improves the operational readiness of British troops in regions with 
climate conflicts, but also strengthens national disaster 
management.  
In the area of development cooperation, “climatizing” the policy 
area increasingly leads to prioritizing climate over development 
policy objectives. This leads e.g. to the relabelling of development 
aid in order to support the pledged national commitments, de facto 
leading to a double-counting of efforts. In the Juncker Commission 
a similar effect is apparent regarding energy policy, as the merger 
of the Directorate General for Climate Action (DG Climate) and 
DG Energy has, de facto, subordinated the first under the latter, 
given the financial resources of both DGs. Meant to solve the so-
called climate-energy-security nexus and increase policy coherence, 
the climatization of different policy fields can have the opposite 
effect, leading to serious fragmentation and overlaps of regulations, 
which further increases complexity and risk of contradiction within 
these structures (as e.g. in the area of agricultural subventions and 
biodiesel). The EU would do better to focus its efforts on 
combatting climate change only. Energy security, for instance, is a 
politically charged and divisive subject in light of the Ukraine crisis 
that should not be blended with climate policy; as is security and 
migration policy. 
The lack of EU policy coherence can also be illustrated by the following 
three incidents around the Paris summit: Firstly, the leaking of an internal 
document outlining the EU’s negotiating position during the conference. 
The document showed the EU’s opposition to discussing trade measures 
and intellectual property rights in the COP21 deal, giving TTIP precedence 
over environmental regulations. Secondly, the fact that the EU kept a back-
door open regarding the planned inclusion of emissions and removals from 
LULUCF (see also box page 14) into its INDC before 2020 – something 
that would seriously lower its ambitions as offsetting carbon absorbed by 
forests could lead to reduced efforts in other parts of the economy. Thirdly, 
the presentation of the EU’s aviation strategy right after COP21, focusing 
on the growth of ever-expanding air traffic, counteracting the pledged 
emission reduction ambitions. A similar lack of ambition was also visible 
at the EU Summit in March 2016, when Heads of States and Governments 
relegated climate change under “Miscellaneous”, with the migration crisis 
dominating the agenda.  
This lack of action is particularly concerning as the assessment by the EU 
Commission in regard to the Paris Climate Agreement concludes that the 
union-wide target of reducing emissions by 40% until 2030 may be 
sufficient for reaching the 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. It is, however, 
not consistent with the more ambitious goal of a maximum temperature 
increase of 1.5°C as compared to pre-industrial levels.56 The accountancy 
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Paris Agreement and accompanying the proposal for a Council decision on the 
firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) thinks that to meet the 2030 target, 
the EU will have to double its decrease in carbon intensity (the amount of 
carbon emitted for each unit of economic output) from a 2% decrease per 
year since 2000 to a 4% annual decrease.57  
During a speech on the follow-up to COP21 at a public session of the 
Environment Council on 4 March 2016, EU Climate Action and Energy 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete pointed out that the EU has a moral 
responsibility to show the same leadership in implementing the Paris 
Agreement as it did in making the agreement possible. The EU speaking 
with a unified voice was crucial in the lead-up to Paris and in developing 
the High Ambition Coalition which shaped the successful outcome. He 
stressed, that the Paris momentum needs to be maintained in all 
international fora including the G7 and G20, the negotiations in the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) later this year as well as 
further talks on the Montreal Protocol, which all provide good 
opportunities to scale up the level of ambition in the pre-2020 period, and 
before the next UN climate summit in Marrakesh, Marocco (COP22). To 
do so, the EU should continue to build on existing initiatives and alliances 
externally, such as the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA+) and go 
beyond its existing commitments of climate finance as part of the USD 100 
billion pledged to the Green Climate Fund by 2020 in order to support 
developing countries for adaptation and renewable energy sources in 
countries and the implementation of NAMAs.58  
 
 
signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under 
the UNFCCC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Brussels, 2 March 2016. 
57 See PwC (2015): How ambitious is the EU's 40% target? PwC Blog, 6 March 
2015, available at http://pwc.blogs.com/sustainability/2015/03/how-ambitious-is-
the-eus-40-target.html. 
58 Miguel Arias Cañete (2016): Speech on the follow-up to COP21, Public Session of 
the Environment Council, Brussels, 4 March 2016, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-586_fr.htm. 
Advancing EU Energy Union, green investments and energy 
efficiency 
Internally, the EU needs to consolidate an enabling environment for the 
transition to a low carbon economy through a wide range of interacting 
policies and instruments as reflected under the Energy Union Strategy, one 
of the 10 priorities of the Juncker Commission. The European Commission 
will prepare an in-depth analysis of the necessary economic and social 
transformations, developing a deep decarbonisation, sector by sector, 
looking beyond 2030 and focusing on sustainability until 2050. 59  
In order to increase its ambitions and make its environmental policy more 
effective, the EU should fast-track the planned reforms to the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS): Although over the last two years the 
price of carbon increased from around 4 to slightly over 7 EUR per tonne 
CO2eq, it still remains well below the EUR 25-30 that were expected when 
the ETS was introduced. A low carbon price also makes offsetting in 
developing counties as part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
less attractive. The ETS should be reformed more deeply, encouraging 
further emissions reductions on the one hand and discouraging energy 
intensive industries from carbon leakage on the other. This could be, for 
example, done by increasing emission reduction targets to at least 30% 
until 2020 and 55% until 2030 (as compared to the 1990 base year) and 
reducing exceptions for energy-intensive industries.  
Another “low hanging fruit” of a green energy transition is improving the 
EU’s energy efficiency policy which is still lagging behind from its 27% 
non-binding target. This could be done by focusing more on the demand 
side (e.g. by installing intelligent meters, adjusting consumer tariffs, 
making supply and consumption more flexible, unlocking storage potential, 
supporting energy efficiency champions and sustainable consumption 
patterns to avoid rebound effects etc.), so companies and private consumers 
will be intrinsically motivated to become more efficient. If measures start 
early and take investment cycles into account, the European Commission 
projects that the costs of energy transition will be manageable, as part of 
 
59 Ibid.  
the costs are offset by improved health and air quality. The proposals that 
the Commission is currently preparing for a new governance mechanism to 
streamline planning and reporting requirements for the post-2020 period 
may be a good opportunity to move in this direction, as will the revision of 
the energy efficiency and renewable energy directives and work on the 
electricity market design scheduled for autumn. Another good way to 
improve energy efficiency would be making the target legally binding.  
To support the long-term transition to a low carbon economy, the EU needs 
an enabling framework with smart and coherent regulations, in particular 
by delivering on a dynamic, efficient and integrated expansion of 
renewable energy within the Energy Union. For accelerating investments in 
green infrastructure, for example, the EU should improve regulations 
regarding compensation for infrastructure and (reserve) storage capacities 
and create financial incentives for the extension of networks and storage 
facilities, as well as for energy-efficient building and transport 
modernization. Buildings are responsible for 36% of CO2 emissions in the 
EU, while transport accounts for around a quarter of emissions. Another 
major role in mitigating climate change can and should be played by 
agriculture as it accounts for another 10% of the EU’s total GHG 
emissions.60  
Furthermore, investment in green research and development needs to be 
scaled up even further, as it would focus on innovation and make 
renewable energies cheaper and thus, more competitive, automatically 
driving societies to switch. According to a report from the European 
Systemic Risk Board, waiting too long to transition to a low-carbon 
economy will greatly increase its costs and risks. There are three ways that 
a delayed transition could affect systematic risk: the impact on GDP of 
sudden changes in energy use, the revaluation of carbon-intensive assets, 
and more frequent natural catastrophes. If all countries transition at the 
right pace, the adjustment costs will be manageable and the risk of stranded 
assets will be lower. The Board recommends that policymakers increase 
disclosure of the carbon intensity of non-financial firms. This would help 
 
60 See Eurostat: GHG Emission Statistics, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics. 
quantify financial firms’ potential exposure and help estimate the impact of 
a delayed transition on financial institutions.61 
 
7. Conclusion 
The diplomatic strategies of the European Union were decisive for the 
successful conclusion of the Paris Agreement, as the EU successfully 
harmonized internal differences early on and was thus, able to speak with a 
unified voice in the run up to the climate summit. Furthermore, the Union 
put a sufficient amount of funds on the table to convince developing 
countries to join its negotiation goals. This somehow re-established the 
EU’s role as a “leadiator” in global climate negotiation or, in other words, 
its ability to act as a leader by backing up its pledges with credible actions, 
whilst at the same time mediating between and among potential partners.  
In this sense, Paris has been an important step, as leaders have shown that 
there is life after multilateralism. This is particularly important as a second 
Copenhagen would have not only had severe consequences for the global 
climate, but would have also further eroded the credibility of the UN 
System and its capacity for solving problems of common goods 
through international cooperation, consequently leading to further 
fragmentation in global governance. However, it is only a symbolic 
triumph so far as leaders have left the toughest nuts for future leaders to 
crack, namely the huge disparity between collective ambition and 
individual obligation which is the core challenge of any collective action 
problem. Building in dynamic commitments that are reviewed (and, 
hopefully, ramped up) every five years, leaders have found a way to 
circumvent the issue for now, starting a global bottom-up experiment for its 
solution instead. Only time will tell whether the experiment agreed upon in 
Paris will work - or, in other words, whether nations will really deliver on 
their pledges, raise their ambitions, and honour their commitments to turn 
 
61 European Systemic Risk Board (2016): Too late, too sudden: Transition to a low-
carbon economy and systemic risk, Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee, 
No 6/February 2016, available at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ 
 ASC_6_1602.pdf?829a1b407eb1e9d82ef45228a4884536. 
the Paris Agreement into credible action. The first litmus test will be the 
interpretation of technical details in Bonn in May 2016. 
In order to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the EU 
needs to fast-track the implementation of the 2030 Energy and Climate 
Framework and related forthcoming legislative proposals, such as deeper 
reforms to the ETS and regulations regarding energy efficiency, 
particularly in the building and transport sector. It should also scale-up 
investment in green infrastructure, not only within Europe but also in 
developing countries (using e.g. carbon-offsetting as defined by the CDM). 
Doing so, would enable the EU to not only advance to its own targets, but 
also to consolidate its alliance with ACP countries and SIDS. Last but not 
least, research and development of green technologies will need to be 
increased even further as part of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, as this 
would make them more affordable, intrinsically motivating people to 
switch.  
So far, the actions of the EU might only be in line to reach the 2°C, but not 
the 1.5°C target as set in the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, the 
Commission opted against ramping up the EU’s 2030 targets in its 
proposals. A significantly more ambitious compromise between Heads of 
States and Governments seems rather improbable, regarding opposition 
from countries such as Poland, Italy, Lithuania and Hungary and the fact 
that any more ambitious EU Climate Package needs to be passed by 
unanimous vote. The unwillingness of some EU member states to commit 
to meaningful actions on the one hand and the lack of strong leadership on 
behalf of the European institutions on the one hand may continue to 
threaten the EU’s position as a moral leader in the fight against climate 
change, and thus also tormenting its role as a mediator between developed 
and developing countries – an issue that has stalled UN Climate Talks for 
decades. Under these circumstances, discussions around the future of the 
carbon market and the sharing of efforts between states to reach a ramped 
up target will be long and complicated, and could take until at least 2018 to 
finalise. By the end of 2020, all countries must communicate their mid-
century, long-term decarbonisation strategies to the UNFCCC. This means 
that the “atmospheric bathtub” will continue to be filled with GHG 
emissions for at least another five years – despite the fact that the failure of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation has risen to the top again in 2016: 
The World Economic Forum perceived it as the most important risk for the 
years to come, ahead of weapons of mass destruction (ranked 2nd) and 
water crisis (ranked 3rd).62 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
62  World Economic Forum (2016): The Global Risk Report 2016, 11th Edition, 
Cologne/Geneva, 2016, available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2016/. 
Annex 
Table 1: Member State Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits in 2020 
compared to 2005 levels 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ 
effort/index_en.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Member State Positions on the 2030 EU Framework for 
Climate and Energy Policies 
Member 
state 
GG: 
Binding 
40% 
GG: 
At 
least 
40% 
EE: 
Binding 
30% 
EE: 
Non‐
binding 
(30%) 
EE: 
25% 
non‐
binding
EE: 
No 
target
R: 
Binding 
27% 
R: Non‐
binding 
27% 
R: At 
least 
27% 
binding 
R: 30% 
binding
R: At 
least 
27% 
non‐
binding
Austria  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Belgium  (Yes)  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  No  No  (Yes)  No  No 
Bulgaria  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Croatia  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Cyprus  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Czech  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Denmark  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Estonia  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Finland  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
France  (Yes)  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  No  No  (Yes)  No  No 
Germany  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Greece  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Hungary  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Ireland  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Italy  (Yes)  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  No  No  (Yes)  No  No 
Latvia  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Lithuania  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Luxembourg  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Malta  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Netherlands  (Yes)  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  No  No  No  (Yes)  No 
Poland  (Yes)  No  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  (Yes)  No  No  No 
Portugal  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Romania  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Slovakia  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Slovenia  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Spain  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Sweden  No  (Yes)  (Yes)  No  No  No  No  No  No  (Yes)  No 
UK  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No 
 
 
Source: Crisp, James (2014): Member states’ positions on 2030 climate and energy 
targets revealed, EurActiv, 17. Oktober 2014 (updated: 23. Oktober 2014, accessed 25 
March 2016), available at: http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/member-
states-positions-on-2030-climate-and-energy-targets-revealed/. 
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CBDR-RC Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism  
COP  Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC) 
ETS  Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)  
EU  European Union 
GCCA  Global Climate Change Alliance (later GCCA+) 
GCF  Green Climate Fund 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
INDC  Intended National Determined Contribution 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
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LDCs  Least Developed Countries  
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
NDC  National Determined Contribution 
NEEAP National Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
QELRO Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objective  
REC  Regional Economic Community 
REDD  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation with 
sustainable management of forests, conservation of forest carbon stocks 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks constituting the "+"  
SIDS  Small Island Developing States  
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